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WHAT IS A FAIR POLITY?
IT ALL DEPENDS. AS ONE MIGHT SAY, ON WHAT FAIR  IS, FAIRNESS CAN
mean  many  things. Whatever i t  may  mean  (within  the  realm o f
common meanings of the term), it is important; and this for several
reasons. Governments  make collective decisions for a political  unit,
decisions that are binding and authoritative  for a collectivity. These
decisions play a major role in determining the nature of the sodal and
economic systems in which they are made. The crucial nature of such
decisions for the welfare of those afiFected l^ them easily explains why
their fairness is important to the way in which those subject to these
decisions evaluate them.
In this paper I will focus on what might be meant by fairness in a
democratic regime. There may be more general fairness criteria applica-
ble to any political system—democratic or authoritarian—but  fairness
in relation to political decisions is especially central in a democracy.
Democratic regimes are supposed to be run by the citizenry—or at least
the citizenry ought to be the ultimate authority. Democracies depend
on legitimacy to function effectively; only when a regime is considered
legitimate can i t rule by consent  rather  than  coercion.  Democratic
regimes cannot rely on coerdon to govern and long remain democratic.
Thus, public acceptance is important. This also explains why the public
determination of what is fair—both as a matter of principle and in the
social research  Vol 73 : No 2 : Summer 2006  499evaluation of particular actions of partiailar governments—is central
in democratic rule.
The criterion for democratic fairness I  put forward i s political
equality. I do not argue that political equality is the only possible crite
rion of democratic fairness or that fairness is the only criterion for judg-
ing a democracy, only that political equality is an important criterion
for fairness in a democracy. Further, I argue that political equality as a
criterion for a fair democratic political system is more crucial than is
equality of income or wealth for a fair economy or equality of respect
for a feir cultural or sodal system. I will try to define political equal-
ity to show why it is central to conceptions of a fair democratic polity,
and—since 1 am more a foot-on-the-ground  empirical researcher than
philosophical thinker—show why it is, in fact, impossible to attain,
would not be an unambiguous blessing if attained, but is, nevertheless,
worth pursuing. 1 shall be dealing with issues of fairness in democracy
generally, but will draw examples and material mainly fix)m American
politics. 1 would  think that the same general principles apply else-
where, although the distribution of the impediments to achieving fair-
ness—one of my major themes—will vary.
WHAT, THEN, IS FAIRNESS IN POLITICS AND
GOVERNMENT?
Who Decides What's Fair?
Is it philosophers and scholars of politics? Is it those with an active role
in politics, whether in the media or more directly as activists, campaign-
ers, or oflBcials? Is it the public? There is a role for each. This paper will
draw on the views that political philosophers have put forward in rela-
tion to fairness, the activities of political elites that might be construed
as fair or not, and the perceptions of ordinary citizens at to what is
considered to be fair.
In preparing this paper, I looked at the way in which fairness and
politics are linked in ordinary political discourse. A crude search using
Lexis-Nexis during the 2004 election period makes clear that the two
terms (and their variations) are often linked. Space precludes listing all
500  social researchthe many meanings given to political fairness, but a few points can be
made:
•  Notions of fairness are often invoked in relation to democracy.
Though democracy and fairness may each mean many things, they
are expected to go together.
•  Fairness may refer to the output of a political system: taxes should
be fair. Laws should be impartial and not tmfairly feirly benefit one
group over another.
•  Fairness may also refer to process rather than output. Processes
should be honest and transparent, be unbiased; promises should be
kept.
•  Equality is very often linked to fairness. Policies should treat all
equally. They ought to be impartial and not biased. And processes
should also be equal.
•  People may disagree on what is the most significant criterion; most
would, however, agree that all are important. The violation of any
one of them would represent a limitation on that democracy. Fraud
rather than honesty, secrecy rather than transparency, favoritism
rather than impartiality, unequal rather than equal political voice,
unequal rather than equal treatment All of these would represent
limitations on democracy and indeed call into question its legiti-
macy and acceptance.
•  Disagreement about what is fair is more likely to come over which
criterion to choose in a particular instance.
•  Perhaps the greatest disagreements come in relation to evaluations
of whether actions within a particular criterion are fair or not:
when it comes to output, taxes should be feir, but is it fair to have a
flat tax for everyone or a progressive tax?
•  And, beyond the criteria, are the measurements of the output.
Does President Bush's tax plan benefit the rich only or all citi-
zens? And is that directly (by the impact of the tax on taxpayers'
incomes) or indirectly (by the impact of the tax plan on the
economy)?
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Of the various meanings that could be given to fairness, equality seems
to be most relevant as the central evaluative criterion in judging democ-
racy. I will focus on that. Furthermore, I will focus on equality in the
political process rather than equality in the output of government. In
our book. Voice and Equality, my coauthors and I wrote of the centrality
of voice and equality to democracjr.
Voice and equality are central to democratic participation.
In a meaningful  democracy, the  people's voice must be
loud and clear: clear so that policymakers understand citi-
zen concerns and loud so that they have an incentive to pay
attention to what is said. Since democracy implies not only
government responsiveness to citizen interests but equal
consideration o f the interests of all citizens, democratic
participation must also be equal (Verba, Schlozman, and
Brady, 1995:1).
Our notion of equal voice is similar to many definitions o f the
"essence" of democracy. Michael Saward's definition i n his book The
Terms of Democracy  fits  nicely the conception of political voice: democ-
racy is "a political system in which the citizens themselves have an
equal  input  into  the  making o f  binding  collective  decisions." A
nondemocratic system, in turn, "is a system in which some individual
or subgroup possesses superior power to make binding collective deci-
sions without any formal accountability to citizens" (Saward, 1998:15).
The notion of equal voice is, in fact, central—in one form or another—to
various conceptions of a just system. Brian Barry, in his work on justice
as impartiality, finds that:
a decision process is fair to the extent to which all those
concerned are well informed, and have their interests and
perspectives expressed with equal force and  effectiveness.
It is fair to the extent that what counts as a good argu-
S02  social researchment does not depend on the sodal identity of the person
making it. And it is fair to the extent that it aims at consen-
sus where possible, and where consensus is not possible it
treats everybody equally (e.g., by giving everybody one vote
(Barry, 1995:110).
Why Choose Equai Voice as the Criterion  for  Poiiticai Fairness?
To begin with, that is what the word "fair" seems to mean. It involves
a comparison coupled with a moral judgment. When the child moves
ftx)m equating unfairness with something he does not like ("I want to
stay up later, and its not fair that I can't") to making a comparative
statement ("It's not  fiur  that my sister can stay up later and I can't"), he
has caught on to fairness as a comparative/evaluative concept.
Or ask the Ox^d English Dictionary. There we find (leaving out fair
skin and fair damsels) reference to:
•  Free from bias, fraud, or injustice: equitable, legitimate.
•  Affording an equal chance of success; not unduly favorable or
adverse to either side.
•  Upright conduct in a game: equity in the conditions or opportuni-
ties aflforded to a player.
If we interpret the term "game" to include the game of politics,
we get to what seems to be the meaning most would give to a  feir  polity.
People ought to be treated equally in their opportunity to take part in
the game.
Why is Fairness as Equaiity ParticuiaHy important in Evaluating Poiitics?
Fairness as equality is. I believe, more central to government and political
affairs than it is in other domains of human life. To begin with, govern-
ment is, by its very nature, a human agency making collective decisions.
•  Human action: Outcomes that derive  fix)m  human action are more
subject to moral evaltiation than are acts of nature. Second,
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more subject to such evaluations than are outcomes that are unin-
tended. Third, intended actions that aflfect large populations and aflFect
them differentially are even more open to moral evaluation. And,
lastly, such actions, when carried out or endorsed by government (the
authorized actor) are most open to moral evaluations (Shklar, 1990).
A tsunami in the Indian Ocean may cause more human  suffering
than almost any other event, but it is not a moral act (though of
course it may be seen as such from some religious points of view).
The failure of governments to provide a warning sjrstem before
the flood or adequate relief after will be so seen. If poorer people
occupy the low ground and wealthier the high ground, with the
consequence that more of the former drown, the income inequal-
ity that led to that outcome may be seen to be unfair, but it will not
be as unfoir as would government relief directed more fiiUy to the
better-off. Genocidal acts by marauding gangs in Rwanda or Sudan
are morally condemned, but even more so if governments implicitly
or explicitly support or sanction such acts. When governments are
partial, biased, or corrupt, the moral evaluation is most severe.
•  Collective decisions and allocations: The fiact that governments are
human, intentional agencies that make dedsions for collectivities
makes fairness, and fairness as equality, especially relevant. Some
may consider market allocations unfair—and individuals certainly
do not have equal voice in markets since resources are unequal and
markets certainly do not yield equal outcomes—^but the fact that
they are the result of a multiplicity of individual decisions rather
than a single government decision likely reduces the resentment of
an outcome perceived to be unfair.
Why I s  Equal  Voice  Especially  Important i n  Evaiuating  Democratic
Government?
Fairness as equality is especially significant in democracies; it is indeed
an intrinsic component of democracy. If we take democracy to be a
political system in which the ultimate rulers are the citizens—in which
504  social researchdecisions by governing bodies are responsive to the needs and  prefer-
ences of the citizenry—then fairness as equality means that citizens
have an equal voice over government actions, that the game of politics
is played on a level playing field: "equity in the conditions or opportxmi-
ties aflForded to a player." Political equality thus refers to the conduct of
the game—^the process by which political dedsions are made. The fair
game has rules and procedures that give each player (citizen) and each
team (group or category of citizens) an equal chance of winning.
Equal voice is also instnunentally valuable to successful democ-
racy. Democracy depends in good part on citizen consent. Perceived
inequalities of voice challenge the legitimacy of the government, reduc-
ing consent and requiring, perhaps, a more coercive government. If the
inequalities in voice are the result of intended government actions—
fraud, biased election laws, bribery, and backroom access—such viola-
tions by governments that are expected to be responsive to the people
are most likely to lead to widespread discontent. Equal voice, this makes
dear, needs not only to be equal objectively (whatever that entails) but
needs to be perceived to be so.'
Fairness as equality is also closely linked—indeed, in some cases,
may encompass—many of the other features associated with democ-
racy. Democracies are evaluated by the extent to which they provide
freedoms to all dtizens, they follow the rule of law and afford all citi-
zens impartial treatment before the law, openness, and transparency,
honesty in governmental actions, accountability to the public. All of
these virtues are either fostered by or foster equal political voice.
In addition, though this discussion focuses on political equality
as equal voice, it is not unrelated to equality in government  policies
and in the implementation of those polides. Democracy is a system by
which dtizens, ultimately, control govenmiental dedsions. It is also a
system whose basic prindple includes equal consideration of the needs
and preferences of all dtizens. Equal political voice is the key to equal
consideration. It is through political activity that citizens convey to the
government their needs and their preferences. And equal political activ-
ity—equal voice in the processes of politics—makes it more likely that
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Note, however, that equal voice is not the same as equal consideration
of the needs and preferences of each citizen. Equal voice may not-^vfll
not, in fact—result in equal consideration, for reasons spelled out later.
Nevertheless, it is a significant step—indeed, a requisite to such consid-
eration and sufficient as a criterion for political fiaimess.
Last, just as political equality is especially relevant in democra-
cies, equality is more espedally relevant to the politics of democratic
regimes than to their economic systems. The political ideal—however
imattainable it may be—is for equal political voice for all citizens; an
ideal embodied in such institutions as equal voting rights, equal rights
to free speech, and equality before the law. There is no such equal ideal
in economic matters; no one person, one dollar to parallel the ideal of
one person, one vote in political matters; or, rather there is no such
expectation of economic equality if economic welfare derives from
the market. If, however, govemment produces the economic inequal-
ity, it is another matter. As Ronald Dworkin puts it at the beginning
of his accoimt of equality as the sovereign virtue: "No govemment is
legitimate if it does not show equal concem for the fate of those citi-
zens over whom it claims dominion,,,, [But] when a nation's wealth
is very unequally distributed, as the wealth of even very prosperous
nations now is, then its equal concem is suspect," This is the case,
however, because "a citizen's wealth massively depends on which laws
his community has enacted" (Dworkin, 2000:1), This would not be the
case—or, at least, less strongly the case—if unequal distribution were
solely attributable to market forces,^
This is not. however, to argue that politics and economics repre-
sent, in fact, two separate spheres of  justice and equality, A normatively
justified  inequality in the economic realm—the wide differential i n
income across individuals, for instance—undercuts the normatively
expected equality in the political realm, as, for instance, when large-
scale campaign contributions can buy more votes than the single vote
to which a citizen is entitled, (This is a major theme of the rest of this
paper,) The fact that one perceives a "boundary violation" between the
506  social researchtwo spheres when greater income gives greater political voice indicates
how central is equal voice in politics, more than equality is central
in other domains. Those with higher incomes can legitimately buy a
wider array of goods fi-om bigger houses to j^hions to gourmet foods.
They ought not to be able, legitimately, to buy elections or access to
officials.
How Is Political Voice Expressed? The Modes of Political Activity
Citizen voice can be expressed in many ways. The most common—^that
which is engaged in by more people that any other mode of expres-
sion—is through voting. But there are many other modes of citizen
activity: time given to political campaigns or work for political causes,
contributions of money, conucts to officials, protests, petitions, initiat-
ing legal action, and more. These activities create two kinds of input
into  the  political  decision-making  system:  information  and  pres-
sure. They inform  elected officials,  candidates for office, a s well as
nonelected officials  about the needs and preferences of the citizenry.
And they apply pressure—the promise of reward, the threat of sanc-
tions—^for a positive response. Different acts provide different amounts
and mixes of information and pressure. Measuring the strength of any
individual's political voice—how much information and pressure he or
she communicates—is not easy, in fact, is impossible in any full sense.
Locating instances of equal voting strength across individuals, as we
shall see, is difficult  enough—even though the vote is a simple and
measurable act to which citizens are usually limited to one and only
one. Locating equahty as a sum of the political acts of individuals is
much more difficult. As we will see, the strength of a citizen's political
voice is the complex sum of many activities. Yet comparisons can be
made, certainly precisely enough to locate inequalities.
The Stages of Politicai Equality*
Complete political equality would refer to a process by which citizens
would be equal in their input into the political system and would receive
an equal response. For this to occur, citizen equality would need to exist
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governmental output.
Process: Equai Political Voice
> Citizens would have equal political rights.
•  Political structures would provide the opportunity for equal exer-
cise of those tights.
> Citizens would have equal individual capabilities to exerdse such
rights,
•  Citizens would also have equal institutional and sodal support for
the exerdse of those rights.
*  Citizens would be motivated actually to take advantage of such
rights,
•  And ddzens would be equal in exercising their rights.
Output: equai response
*  Messages sent would be equally heard.
> And messages would be equally responded to.
These stages need further explication. My main focus will be on
equality of voice, though I will relate voice to response.
THE STAGES OF POLITICAL  VOICE
The Equai Right to Participate
This  main  democratic  requirement  includes,  among  other  rights,
universal adult suffrage: freedom of speech, the press, and other modes
of political expression; the right to organize political groups and politi-
cal parties: and equality before the law. These basic entitlements, held
(more or less) universally, are considered necessary features of  any demo-
cratic regime in almost all contemporary conceptions of democracy. As
far as the United States is concerned, these are pretty much in place as
a result of the Nineteenth amendment, the dvil and voting rights acts
508  social researchof the 1960s, as weU as the extension of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the states. There are no legal barriers to citizen participation because
of gender or race/ethnidty, and we have numerous legal protections
against discrimination along those lines.'* A muted debate about age
restrictions on participation was largely ended with the Twenty-sixth
Amendment. The right to vote, it must be noted, is more than an instru-
mental right—the chance to influence public policy (however margin-
ally) by casting a vote for one's favored candidate. It is that, but much
more. It "is the characteristic, the identifying feature of democratic citi-
zenship in America, not a means to other ends."*
Two aspects of  these issues deserve special note. One is the distinc-
tion between  the explicit, intended  consequences o f equality-limit-
ing rules and the unintended equality-limiting consequences of such
rules. Restricting the voting rights of felons or former felons, under the
explicit jiistification that felons have stepped outside the moral realm
of citizenry, has the consequence of disproportionately restricting the
voting rights of African-American  males (Uggen and Manza. 2002: 777-
803). In former  times, restrictions based on literacy, on the  explicit
justification  that people need to be literate to be informed voters, had
the eflFect of limiting the political activity of immigrants and blacks—a
limitation that was surely intentional regarding African Americans in
the South. Does denial of the franchise to felons violate political equal-
ity? The right to vote is a basic civic right that ought to be available to
all citizens, yet one can argue that those who have committed a felony
may have forfeited  that right because they have stepped out of civil
sodety. If the loss of the franchise hits black dtizens more heavily, but
is an unintended consequence of the voting law, that is one thing—still
controversial as to its fairness but possibly justifiable. But if its real and
intended  purpose i s to disenfranchise  African  Americans—perhaps
for partisan advantage or out of plain racial prejudice—it i s clearly an
unfair violation of political equality. The fact that a lifetime denial of
the vote is largely found in southern states suggests that latter interpre-
tation. The fact that such a law is also foimd in the state of Washington
makes the case ambiguous.
Fairness, Equality, and Democracy  509Another important factor in relation to equal rights is the locus of
control over participatory rights. The feet that many asperts of voting
rights—the rights of felons, for instance—are the control of individual
states raises obvious issues of equality of rights.
The equal  right to take  part i n  politics does not  ensure  that
people will take part equally. I shall deal with that issue in the  next
several sections where I consider the structural and individual char-
acteristics that  affect  whether and  how people participate. But the
nature of rights is relevant to the issue of how close one comes to actual
equality in political voice. If one wanted, through law, to ensure equal
actual participation it would require, in addition to a permissive and
equal right to participate, a legal ceiling and a legal floor on how much
activity in which an individual could engage. The amount of activity for
each participant would be limited. This is the case with the vote; each
voter is allowed one. However, for full equality, one would need a law
that says that a citizen does not have the right not to vote. Compulsory
voting does not exist in the United  States though i t exists in  some
other nations.* For other modes of activity, the creation of a ceiling
and a floor is more complex. The amount of activity can vary and does.
Individuals can write more than one letter and give more than  one
dollar. Making it illegal not to participate—compulsory attendance at
meetings, compulsory contributions to election campaigns—smacks of
authoritarianism, and that road to full equality may lead to the end of
democracy. Setting a ceiling on activity—such as the limitation to one
vote—is more complex when it comes to money (where ceilings have
been set to mixed effects) and hard to imagine when it comes to other
acts (for instance, a law that one can only say so much or write so many
letters). These are important issues and will come up again when we
discuss differential capabilities.
So although most normative theories of participation are in agree-
ment that equality of rights is a necessary condition for democracy, some
controversies remain, both in fact and in terms of the ideal state. I will
not focus on these controversies, but wiU tum to the next step in the path
to effective citizen voice: political structures that foster equal voice.
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Rights are exercised in political and legal settings. These settings affect
the use and the equality of the use of such rights. This can be seen in
relation to the vote, the political act that comes closest to affording an
equal voice to individuals. Even assuming that aU citizens have an equal
individual right to cast one and only one vote, voting may be unequal.
Votes cast might not be counted; votes not cast might be. Corrupt elec-
tion practices such as ballot destruction and ballot box stuffing are well-
known features of some elections. As we know  fi^om  recent presidential
elections, there are many vrays in which ballot access can vary—legally
and illegally, advertently and inadvertently—that  bias access to the
vote with consequences for voting equality.
In addition, a single vote counts for more in a smaller constitu-
ency: citizens in Wyoming cast votes that have 70 times the weight for
US senator as a vote in California, and a similar, though less extreme
distortion is found through the Electoral College's means of allocating
elector seats. In addition, through party-based gerrymandering as well
as other forces, fewer congressional constituencies are truly competi-
tive. In such locales, the vote of the minority party supporter  surely
counts for less,'
Issues of district  size illustrate the effect o f some  inequality-
producing  structures on other democratic desiderata. The  unequal
value of the vote in different-size  states was, originally, adopted t o
protect minorities—that is, those who lived in smaller  states—from
domination by the majority living in larger states. This justification of
protection for small states is no longer particularly relevant today. But
the general point that limiting equality of political voice might increase
the democratic goal of protecting minority rights remains valid,
Inequality<reating variations across constituencies are less obvi-
ous when it comes to other modes of political activity. In the United
States, the  First Amendment  freedoms  that  undergird  the  right t o
take part in election campaigns or to communicate with govemment
officials are uniform  and strong across states and localities.  Different
campaign contribution  laws across states might, on the other  hand.
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state to state. Perhaps the greatest variation in political and govern-
ment  institutions  that  might aflFect the equality of political activity
diflFerentially from locale to locale would be diflFerences in the quality
and equality of educational institutions from state to state or locality to
locality—since schooling is the major source of the civic skills needed
to be active. We will return to this theme when we consider variations
in individual resources for activity.
Nongovernment Structural Sources of Inequality
Organized interests play a major role in American politics, and they
have a major impact on the capacity of citizens to communicate politi-
cal voice. Organizations may do so in several ways: individuals may act
politically by belonging to, working in, or contributing to associations
that try to influence the government. Or organizations may represent
or act as surrogates for individuals who may or may not belong, speak-
ing for them through lobbying or campaign contributions or informal
connections to officials. And organizations can mobilize  individuals
to political activity. The issue of who, exactly, organizations represent
and the relationship of organizational representation and equality is
complex and hard to define and measure in any precise way. Suffice to
say that the pressure group system has for long " simg with an upper<lass
accent," to use Schattschneider's well-known description, and there is
no evidence that this is diminishing. It may indeed be increasing as
such institutions as labor unions become smaller. There are many more
organized interest groups speaking for the more advantaged members
of society than for the less well-oflF. And the advantaged are more likely
to belong to and be active in organized associations that stimulate and
mobilize political voice.* The institution that does most to mobilize less
advantaged citizens, especially since the weakening of labor unions,
is the church. And churches, as one of the few institutions in America
that draws members from across economic levels, does reduce (or at
least not accelerate) socioeconomic stratification o f political activity.
However, the impact of this religion-based mobilization on economic
512  social researchequalizing polides is diminished somewhat by the fact that their agen-
das are often on social, cultural, and religious issues. On the other hand,
if such issues are the important preferences of disadvantaged people,
an increase in their political voice on such matters does represent an
increase in the equaliQr of pohtical voice (Bums, Schlozman, and Verba,
2001).
Equal Capacity: The Individual's Resources"
As the old saying goes, freedom o f the press is a wonderful  right if
you own a press. Rights require resources. One of the basic resotirces
is civic skills: the ability to understand and act effectively i n relation
to political and dvic life. These skills include the ability to partidpate
eflFectively: knowledge of political decision-making structures so as to
intervene eflFectively in the decisional processes as well as the capadty
to speak publicly, to organize and work with others so as to commu-
nicate one's preferences eflFectively. In addition. eflFective participants
need information o n the basis of which they can make choices that
increase the chance that their activity will result in outcomes they actu-
ally prefier. This includes an understanding of public polides, the stance
of candidates on such polides, as well as some information  about the
likelihood that a candidate will fulfill  campaign promises. Those who
lack such information and understanding cannot be thought to have
equal political expression with those who do. Their voices may be as
loud, but their ability to achieve their preferences will be limited. They
may vote but their vote may go to the wrong person—that is, someone
who will foster polides they do not fevor (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady,
2004: Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996).
Thus, a fair  and equal  political process may rest on an  equal
educational  system  and  equal access to reliable  information  about
political choices. Equality of information  and understanding is, obvi-
ously, not easy to come by. Education is far fix)m equal; political skills
are also unequal. Candidates and the media may not be as helpful a s
one would like. Studies have shovvTi that individuals can get by with
less than full knowledge of political issues and alternatives. Individuals
Fairness, Equality, and Democracy  513can use information shortcuts; they can reasonably be guided by party
leaders, they can rely on surrogate informational  resources, such as
reliable friends or other political "role models" who can help one make
reasonable decisions. Such surrogates reduce the need for individually
possessed skill resources. Access to such surrogates is, however, likely
to be quite unequally distributed (Huckfeldt, 2001),
Everything that has been said about skills and information  can
also be said—with even greater firmness—about  financial  resources.
Political contributions represent the mode of political activity that is
the most unambiguously resource dependent. One needs money to take
part in politics as a financial contributor. And, as Hemingway reminded
us, the rich have more of it,"
Resources and opportunity make political equality deeply depen-
dent on equality in other domains, such as education, income, connect-
edness, and health and well-being. In turn, political equality  fosters
equality in other domains by increasing the likelihood of policies that
favor educational, social, and economic equality. This makes dear why
the capacity to exercise equal political voice is of central concem in a
democracy, Amartya Sen, in his discussion of what "goods" are crucial to
equalize, refers to certain basic capabilities needed to achieve a full life
(Sen, 2000), Political voice is one of these, since it allows the individual
to acquire many other valued goods, such as income, education, health,
and respect. And the latter, in turn, are general capabilities that enable
the acquisition of political voice. In other words, political voice may be
in the center of a virtuous circle of capabilities for those advantaged in a
sodety as well as a vidous circle of incapacities for the disadvantaged,
is Unequal Voice Based in Unequal Resources Unfair?
As with all forms of inequality, the degree of normative concem depends
on the source of the inequality. When it comes to such  resources as
skills or money or social connectedness, the question can be raised as
to whether the disadvantaged are so because of stmctural conditions
beyond their control or because they do not take advantage of oppor-
tunities. Is it that schools were unequal or pupils did not work hard?
514  social researchAre income diflFerences—and  the resulting inequality in the  ability
to influence  politics through campaign contributions—the  result of
unequal job and career opportunities or unequal eflFort? If those who
lack resources are in some way deprived of the resource in ways beyond
their choice, that is more unfair than if the resotirce inequality is based
on unequal eflFort in school or in the economy. Such questions go well
beyond the scope of this paper. But both individual choices and struc-
tural inequalities are probably at play—and certainly the latter are not
insignificant.
In addition,  whether a n  inequality in  resource is  considered
unfair  may depend on the resource. In the analyses of the  resource
basis of political activity, my collaborators and I focus attention on a
variety of resources of which money, dme, and skills play a major role
(Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 2004). The extent to which disparities are
perceived as being unfair varies across these resources, with disparities
in money being the most delegitimizing. Large-scale political contribu-
tions from those who have the resources call into question the fairness
and equality of the electoral process. But if some have more time and
give more time to political campaigns than others, that is not seen as
being as unfair." And though the ability to act effectively in politics is a
skill very unequally distributed, the fact that one participant can make
compelling statements at political meetings and another cannot is not
an inequality thought to challenge the fairness of the process.
Equal Voice: Do People Use Their Rights, Opportunities, and Resources?
That one has the right to exercise political voice, as well as the oppor-
tunity and the capability so to do, does not mean that one will do so.
Equal rights, equal opportunity, and equal capacity do not necessarily
result in equal voice. Individuals may lack motivation to participate.
People have different  tastes. Some care about politics; they are more
engaged and interested, more willing to give time and eflFort to express
their views and defend their interests. Others care more about getting
ahead on the job, or, in their nonworking hours, care more about time
with family, or about sports or entertainment. The reason for diflFeren-
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as others (they lack resources) or it may be that some do not want to be
active (they care less). If someone stays home from a local council meet-
ing because he prefers to watch a favored television program and there-
fore has less voice over some local issue that may aflFect him, we would
not consider that unfair. It would be diflFerent if the lack of activity was
due to lack of resources (say, for a babysitter).
However, motivation, like resources, has origins. Schools incul-
cate interest in politics and teach dvic skills. If diflFerential motivation
comes from diflFerential schooling, motivation may represent a sodally
determined outcome rather than a chosen taste. Nor can one separate
motivation from  resources. If one does not have the resources to be
active, one is also likely to have lower motivation. In a similar manner,
diflFerential motivation may derive from unequal treatment in the polit-
ical or economic system. Numerous studies have shown that a sense
of eflScacy is a key to activity. Those who think they can be eflFective in
political matters are more likely to be active. But eflHcacy is learned. It
can be based on previous experience. In our studies of participation, we
found that many individuals were unwilling to participate in politics
because they had tried and failed. Learned apathy applies to groups as
well. Those from less valued groups—women, minority racial or ethnic
groups, immigrants—may feel disrespected in society and  therefore
feel unmotivated to take part (Conover, Searing, and Crewe, 2004).
What this means is that political equality may be self-reinforcing,
and political inequality may be as welL Many democratic theorists have
stressed the educational role of political partidpation. Citizens learn to
be enlightened and eflFective dtizens by taking part Unequal opportu-
nities to take part or the perception of such teach a lesson that leads to
more inequality in the future a s those who see themselves as weaker
withdraw from the game.
Equai Poiiticai Voice: A Summation
The previous discussion makes clear that achieving fiilly equal voice
as input—the criterion chosen for this analysis—is difficult,  unlikely.
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I argue that it is a goal worth striving for if one wants a polity that will
be considered feir by those living in it—and by most philosophers and
sodal scientists observing it. Or, to make the goal more modest yet,
a polity that deviates in a gross manner from the conditions of equal
voice has little chance of being considered feir.
However, to get full political equality, one has to consider the
consequences of dtizen voice. Suppose one could achieve or come close
to a polity in which citizens were all equally free to express their politi-
cal preferences and do so: Would that represent political fairness? In
large part yes, but obviously not completely. If the public were send-
ing messages about needs and preferences, would it not be important
that the messages be received and acted upon, that the process creating
equal voice should also produced equal response?
Considering Equal Response: is Anyone Listening?
The right to partidpate, the capadty to partidpate, and actual partid-
pation represent crucial steps toward equal consideration. But equal
consideration  may involve additional  steps  having to do with  the
response of governing offidals to the expressed political voice. What
if you send a message and no one pays attention? Two individuals may
speak as loudly or as clearly, but the message of one may be heard and
the other ignored. Two dtizens may be equal in their voice (both write
frequent  and compelling  letters to government  officials,  and  both
attend town  meetings regularly), but one may, for various reasons,
receive more attention than the other," If some letters are read and
others left unopened, if some campaign workers or contributors have
the ear of the candidate and others do not, that is not equal voice. This
makes clear that one has to look beyond the acts of the individual to
locate political equality. Indeed, equality as fairness would demand an
equal hearing: that the public be heard, that letters be read, that votes
be counted. The equal expression of political voice is the first and neces-
sary step to political equality as feimess, but an unequal reception when
equal political voices are raised may generate an even greater sense of
Fairness, Equality, and Democracy  517unfairness than would the absence of equal expression. Such is often
the case following the "opening" of a formerly closed polity.
And What Is the Response?
I have focused o n political equality as process, not political equality
as output or results; on having the right, the capacity, and the moti-
vation t o express  one's  preferences  and  doing  so, rather  than o n
getring one's wishes fulfilled.  However, the ultimate  purpose—or,
at least, one of the main purposes—of political activity is to get  the
government t o do something in one's  interest,  whether  that be a
policy or a political favor. Political equality in its fullest  sense would
be equal policy output. Full equality of treatment would be a set of
policies that treated all citizens equally. In some sense, these last two
aspects of political equality—^being heard and getting results—repre-
sent its "true'* instrumental  meaning and are the ultimate payoff of
equal participation and equal voice. They are difficult to observe and
measure. The literature on the receipt of messages and the response
to them is not as well developed as that on the messages sent. Making
the connection is complicated since policies derive from many forces,
not just citizen input. And sorting out why preferences and elite deci-
sions overlap is not easy.''*
Why Is Procedural Equaiity More important Than Output Equaiity?
In democratic societies, where preferences  and values are not set by
some higher religious doctrine or by unaccountable authorities, there
will inevitably be diflFerences of values and preferences across individu-
als and groups. Some will prefer one political outcome (particular people
or parties in control of the government), others another outcome (other
oflRceholders, other policies). In the struggle for control over personnel
and outcomes, some will win and others lose. The democratic dilemma
is gaining the voluntary acquiescence of the losers to the results they do
not favor. The democratic answer is that the losers dislike the outcome,
but accept it as legitimate if the rules of democratic procedure  are
followed—and if those rules are fair. Process justifies outcomes.'*
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process by which political decisions are made. It does not mean equal-
ity of outcome; it is not a children's game in a progressive school where
everyone gets a prize. There are inevitably winners and losers. But the
fair game has rules and procedures that give each player (dtizen) and
each team (group or category of dtizens) an equal chance of winning.
Procedures lead to outcomes. If the outcome is unfair and  unequal,
proper equal procedures can remedy it. But if procedures are  unfair
or unequal, they may, in and of themselves, make it diflRcult or impos-
sible to remedy the inequality. If a group is deprived by tax law of fair
and equal treatment, but the process of decision making is equal and
feir, the law can be changed. The acts of the deprived may be weaker
because of the inequality, but they at least can work to change it. If,
however, the deprivation is a procedural one—a deprivation of equal
political voice, where, say, the tax is a poll tax—the deprived group may
not be able to redress that inequality. Inequalities are less severe where
those who are treated unequally can work to redress the inequality.^*
It may be useful to consider the opposite position, well articu-
lated by Ronald Dworkin (2000: 185 ff). Dworkin argues for a concep-
tion o f political  equality based on  equality of government  output,
rather than one based on process, as is our notion of equal voice. His
argument is that the diflficulty o f defining and measuring equality of
influence makes it an undesirable focus as the goal of political equal-
ity. It is true that equality of voice is diflHcult to measure. It is. however,
easier to measure than equality of outpuL Measuring equality of output
is, I believe, more difldcult given diflFerences in taste. One would have to
evaluate the equality of the outcome in the light of the relationship of
the output to the diflFerent preferences of dtizens or, stated more gener-
ally, in relation to the inevitable diflFerent conceptions of the good. One
need only observe debates about sodal issues such as abortion and gay
rights, or economic issues such as taxes and sodal security, to know
that there are many views as to what is a fair policy outcome. Which
represents fair and equal treatment: a progressive tax or a flat  tax?
Polides supporting free abortion choice or polides limiting or barring
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one direction or another is not likely, in terms of the substance of the
policy, to be seen to be fair and equal,"
Equality of voice is, in contrast, neutral as to desired outcome or
conceptions of the good,'* It represents a general capability—^in Sen's
terms—to achieve many goals; in the case of political voice, to achieve
whatever one wants to govemment to do. It is true that it is not easy
to measure in any simple way, but it would seem to be more tractable
than measuring equal satisfaction o f preferences when the latter are
heterogeneous," Equal voice, in addition, is an especially  important
criterion of faimess in light of the role of subjective evaluations of feir-
ness in democratic politics. While either process or result may be seen
as imfair, violations of equality in the political process will, I believe,
result in a greater sense of unfairness coupled with a larger loss of legit-
imacy than will unfairness in output,^"
Process and Outcome: Can They Be Separated?
Although I have focused on the process by which dtizens use political
voice to make their needs and preferences known rather than focusing
on the output that results from their input, process and output are not
easily separated. Citizens have different  preferences  for govemment
polides, and political processes are not neutral in the equality relevant
output they produce. Different  electoral processes lead to  differential
results for different preference groups. They may favor minorities over
the majority or vice versa. They may favor one group over another.
Policies can be made in many ways and in many places: more or less
directly by the citizenry through direct democracy procedures, or, if
made more indirectly, they can be made in the executive or the legis-
lature or the courts, in legislative committees or on the floor, by legis-
latures or bureaucratic experts, by central or local govemments. Thus,
the nature of the political process—and the degree to which to it affords
equal voice—^will, of necessity, require taking into account the equality
relevant outputs that it produces. In turn, political outcomes are not
neutral in relation to an equal political process. If equality of citizen
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income distribution or variations in school quality have an impact of
political equality.
Output, Equaiity, and Fairness
Thus, even if citizens can and do express political voice and the expres-
sion is equal, the issue of equal output remains crucial and complex
in relation to the perceived equality and fairness of a political system.
How can a policy be equally responsive to all members of a polity if
decisions must be made under conditions of diflFerential  preferences?
Since binding decisions—binding on all citizens—are made by govern-
ments, there will inevitably be winners and losers. Under what circum-
stances will losers believe that their receipt of the short end of the stick
was fair? This issue is at the heart of discussions as to fair  electoral
systems and, more generally, as to policymaking in fragmented societ-
ies. I cannot enter that discussion here—^it would take a longer paper.
But several points are worth making.
•  The problem of diverse preferences is so severe that political think-
ers have sought ways around it. One major way around the conflict
of preferences is to seek consensus on preferences, either by limit-
ing a polity to like-minded citizens or by engaging in discourse that
leads to some form of consensus. The former, I believe, is impos-
sible with the possible exception of small Utopian communities,
which tend not to remain consensual for all that long. Whether
discourse can result in consensus is an open question. It is not a
likely general solution to the problem of conflicting preferences.
•  Electoral regimes provide diflFerent ways of dealing with preference
conflicts. Majoritarian systems most fully create winners and losers.
Other regimes tend toward minority protection. In the former, the
members of the majority will find the result fair; the minority will
likely find it less feir. Under the latter, the opposite may happen as
a majority sees itself thwarted by a minority or by minorities. Some
argue that proportional  representation  will result in more wide-
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all majoritarian systems, though the point is contested.^'
*  The degree to which some members of a polity find a policy unfair
will depend in part on the distribution of policy positions and their
intensity.
•  The more groups in society are polarized so that one set of individu-
als is on one side on all issues (whether that be a single dominant
issue or a multitude of issues that always divide the sodety the
same way), the more does one have a consistent tyranny of the
majority and the more are the losers likely to find the outcome
unfair.'-
*  This all suggests that feelings of illegitimate inequality and
unfairness will be less if particular segments of society, though
they may lose in a particular instance, believe they may win in
the future. This means that all groups, winners and losers, will
have had an equal chance to express their views. It also means
that losers will have the chance to join a winning coalition in the
future, so that the loss on issue X will be balanced by a win on
issue Y, that their tum may come. They may have lost, but if they
were accorded an equal voice and if they are not discouraged by
their loss, they may—if they continue to have an equal voice and
if they can find partners fTom among the winners last time—^win
in the future.
This makes dear why equal voice is central to maximizing legiti-
macy in divided sodeties. Losers are more likely to accept their loss as
fair if the road to the loss aflForded them equal voice and if they may
hope to win in the future. Unfortunately, not all social divisions aflFord
that opportunity to losers. In such circumstances, fairness as equality
will be hard to achieve. The glory of democracy (when it works) is the
ability to put in office representatives and to create policy that will be
accepted by those who favor an alternative set of oflficials or other poli-
cies. Losers accept the outcome because the process is seen to be fair
and it remains open for other configurations of outcome in the future.
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is not always—perhaps not often—there.^^
Fairness as Equality or Fairness as Winning
Much political debate about fairness is about processes: strong govern-
ment  versus multiple veto points, localism  versus central  decision
making, judicial activism versus legislative dominance,  majontarian
elections versus proportional representation, and on and on. These
are valid topics of debate in terms of their principled relation to politi-
cal eqiiality. But the evaluation of process is often colored by a desired
outcome, rather than a principled position on the process. There are
individuals and groups that prefer federal to state power or vice versa
as general principles, but  more often  groups prefer  federal  control
over an issue area when the outcome is likely to be favorable at that
level, and state control when that appears likely to benefit the particu-
lar interest. Today's supporter of judicial activism is tomorrow's fan of
judicial restraint—dei>ending on who will vrin under which process.
This is not a matter of crude self-interest. That of course plays a role.
Business interests opt for federal  control or state and  local  control
depending on where they will get a better deal or have more lobby-
ing clout.^"* But supporters of non-self-interested  policies—pro-life o r
pro<hoice on abortion, gay marriage rights, for example—also  often
choose the process that leads to the outcome they prefer.
This applies as well to evaluations of the fairness of a political
process. I do not have data on the subject, but I believe it likely that
liberals who are concerned about the inequalities  that  large contri-
butions bring into the electoral arena were less upset when the large
contributions in 2004 went to the liberal group MoveOn than when the
contributions went to the conservative Swift-boat fund. An equal politi-
cal process is a desirable ideal, but winning a substantive battle may be
more important. Furthermore, though the existence of a feir and equal
process ought to legitimate a political outcome and make the losers
accept the loss, evaluations of the fairness and equality of the process
v«ll be influenced by who wins. It depends, as always, on whose ox is
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political equality—but, in fact, makes it more important to do so.
EQUAL VOICE: A CLOSER  LOOK
Political Equality Is Not Aii there Is to Democracy
In what follows, there will be discussion of impediments to political
equality, conditions that make political voice less equal. These impedi-
ments will be, crudely speaking, of two sorts. Some limitations on equal-
ity are detrimental to well-functioning democracy—for instance, unfair
advantages given to particular groups of people by sodal recruitment
structures or limitations on free organizational formation  that apply
differentially. In other cases, the limitations on equal voice may foster
other democratic values: violations of majoritarianism may limit equal-
ity but, at the same time, protect minorities. Or limitation on populistic
equal voice may increase government effectiveness. The latter instances
of conflict among democratic values will remind us that equal voice is
but one of many criteria for democratic performance.
Equal Voice Is Not Necessarily Loud and Effective Voice
It is important to distinguish the amount or strength of citizen voice
from the equality of citizen voice. Citizens can be relatively equal in
their political voice but, on average, have little voice. Indeed, it is often
easier to achieve equality at the lower end of a scale than at the higher
end. (As a line-backer on the Green Bay Packers is purported to have
said about Vince Lombardi: "Coach Lombardi always treated all us play-
ers equally... like dogs!") Indeed, it can be argued that political equal-
ity is in fact detrimental to the strength of citizen control. Equal citizen
voice might be more easily achieved in a "mass" political system in
which citizen voice is limited to voting in populist elections and where
the imderlying set of institutions that structure elections and mobilize
citizen participation—^that is, an effective party and civil associational
system—is weak or nonexistent. The dilemma i s that those  institu-
tions that foster citizen voice—either positively by organizing citizen
voices so that they can be expressed more coherently and  effectively
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the overwhelming imbalance of strength of the individual citizen and
the state—are often highly stratified. Advantaged dtizens—those with
higher incomes or more education or in higher status jobs—are much
more  likely to belong to voluntary  associations  representing  their
economic or sodal interests or providing the resources—such as social
connections or civic skills—that enhance their activity.^' This stratifica-
tion in the United States has increased as unions—^the main institution
for organizing less advantaged workers—have declined.^
Widespread and Strong Versus Equal Voice: A Cioser Look
EflFective democratic voice is, one would assume, loud and widespread
and equal. Lots of people participating, communicating  substantial
information  about their needs and preferences through their activity,
and the activity coming equally from each citizen or from a represen-
tative set of citizens. If the purpose of democratic participation i s to
communicate  the needs and preferences o f citizens, does one  need
widespread partidpation? Might not a representative sample commu-
nicate just as well? George Gallup talked of the sampling  referendum
as a democratic tool.
To begin with, we must note that such communication of needs
and preferences is not the only democratic function of political activity.
Political activity creates community; by being active people come to
feel that they are members of the same polity. It creates bonds. For this
to happen people must, themselves, participate. In addition, participa-
tion may be educative. People learn about politics by taking part; they
become informed by having to choose how to act Last, activity builds
legitimacy. Voting in an election is an act of support for the political
system, even if one votes for the opposition and against the regime in
power.
On the other hand, when it comes to the issue of equal consid-
eration of the needs and preferences of all dtizens, what may be most
important i s that the participation come from a representative set of
citizens. A representative sample survey—which emphasizes random
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it were truly unbiased. So would a "real world" participatory system
in which participation came from only a subset of the citizenry, but
that subset were representative of the politically significant diflFerences
that exist in sodety—that is, diflFerences that are or might become the
subject of governmental action—might also be an adequate means of
informing political leaders of the needs and preferences of the citizenry.
Inequality might not then matter. Unfortunately, almost no survey is
in fact truly unbiased and representative. And in the "real" world of
participation, the rules of sampling and respondent selection do not
hold. Participation is biased by resource and institutional  constraints
and by the self-selection bias associated with the need to be motivated.
Furthermore, the constraints on participation  and the variations in
motivation  are not randomly distributed  with  respect to  politically
significant diflFerences. The result is biased participation.
Even if participation were, in fact, unbiased, the level of activity
would still matter. A large sample survey that was truly representative
would probably provide a better picture of the state of the public than
any census or any participatory system based on citizen voluntary activ-
ity. However, its legitimacy would still be called into question because it
was a sample. Similarly, low voting turnout—even if the nonvoters were
randomly distributed across social groups and political positions—can
diminish the political clout of an election outcome.
Last, the above discussion of the equality of citizen voice ought
not to be taken as meaning that loud and effective  citizen voice is a
minor feature of democratic participation. An eflFective political process
is one in which many opinions can be expressed, polides debated, dti-
zens informed. A limited process that satisfies  representation o f prefer-
ences may not be one that allows for the formation of preferences, the
mobilization of alternative views, and the rich and lively engagement
that one hopes for in democratic processes. But, of course, this is fully
consistent with the desire to have equal voice manifested at all stages
of the political process. The debate ought to be both equal and lively.
In putting equality first, I am not arguing that loud and clear and wide-
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a lot.
Institutional Arrangements and Equal Voice
Equal voice does not entail any particular mechanism or structure for
converting dtizen preferences into government action.
Does equal voice require a majoritarian  system? Not really. If a
minority consistently dominated dedsion making leaving no voice to
the majority, it would certainly violate i)olitical equality. In contrast, a
universal veto system, where any dtizen could block a proposal, would
not necessarily be incompatible with equal voice, as long as all citizens
had an equal right, opportunity, and capacity to exerdse such a veto. Of
cottrse, such a system would either represent an unattainable Utopian
consensus or an unworkable  stalemate  for any government  action.
However, equal voice does not  require a  pure majoritarian  system
where all decisions were decided by majority rule—through a system
in which parliament was dominant and elected by majoritarian  elec-
tions." I will return to complex systems later.
Trustee versus delegate equal voice. This is relevant in representative
systems with representatives who consider themselves delegates who
wish to heed that voice. But it is also relevant to those who would play
the role of trustee: who work for the betterment o f constituents as
she, the trustee, sees it, not necessarily as the constituents themselves
may see it. Government by experts is. for example, a form of trustee
government i n which output i s determined,  not by citizen  prefer-
ences, but by elites who are knowledgeable and want to serve the citi-
zens' best interests. For the trustee or the expert/trustee, citizen voice
that applies pressure on decision makers to hold them  accountable
might play little role. Citizen voice, however, conveys both  informa-
tion about the needs and preferences of citizens and pressure for the
representative to respond to those needs and preferences. Equal voice
is essential for the trustee or expert for the information it carries—if
not about dtizen  preferences  that the trustee/expert might want to
ignore, but about the actual circumstances and needs of citizens. If
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are significant needs that are silent—the ensuing policies will be simi-
larly biased.
Adversarial versus unitary democracy.  Equal  voice i s  relevant i n
systems based on adversarial relations among people with  different
interests and preferences who are trying to win out over others as well
as in consensus-seeking systems aimed at finding some higher public
interest. The calculus of what rules will make things equal will be diflfer-
ent. but a fair competitive election process or a fair process of delibera-
tion will require equality across participants.
Institutional  Structures: Citizen Voice Can Be More or Less Equai under
Various Poiiticai Forms
Representative systems: Citizen voices can be more or less equal in a repre-
sentative democracy where citizen activity is largely limited to electing
representatives. In such a case, equality of voice would entail equality
in the electoral process that chooses representatives: one person, one
vote, fair and open elections, appropriate districting, equal ability to
influence the votes of others, which might, perhaps, entail limits on
the role of money, etc.
Direct democracy: I n a system with  emphasis o n  referendums,
equality would entail equality in the referendum voting process; again
an equal vote and equal ability to influence the votes of others, etc, as
well as equality in the ability to put measures on the ballot.
Discourse or participatory democracy: Equality would entail  equal
access to the public discourse and equal capability to take a full and
effective part in the discussion.
Interest group democracy: Equality would entail equality of member-
ship in and/or representation by organizations that try to  influence
policy.
Use of the courts: In circumstances where the courts are used as
a channel through which govemment i s influenced,  equality would
entail unbiased access to the courts and legal services as well as impar-
tial treatment in court,^*
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What does the existence of complex modes of political activity mean for
equal political voice? In complex democracies where all or many of the
above institutional possibilities for influence exist, equal voice might
take many forms. The United States is such a complex democracy, with
many ways in which policy can be influenced. There are many levels
of government, separation of powers on each level, and a vast array of
government agendes offering  multiple channels of access. There are
more elections for more oflBces in the United States than in any nation,
not to mention a vast array of referendums at the state and local leveL
Organized interests are more widespread and active than in almost any
democracy. Courts take a major policy role, by no means limited t o
the Supreme Court interventions on constitutional matters. Parallel to
this are the many wajrs in which dtizens can be active and multiplic-
ity of ways in which dtizen activity can be stimulated. There is a large
and vibrant dvil society and associational system, diverse media, and
multiple ways in which dtizens can express their views.
Equal voice, in such a complex setting, ojjens the possibility that
individuals or groups might balance weak voice in one domain with
stronger voice in another. DiflFerent individuals and groups can and do
use different modes of activity, diflFerent channels of access, and deploy
diflFerent resources. There is significant variation in which groups use
which modes of activity and which channels. Some are active and eflFec-
dve in one arena while not so in another. And groups shop around to
find  the most advantageous approach. If you cannot  get  legislative
response,  try the courts; the feds are not  responsive, go to the state
house. Does such a multiplidty of possibilities foster equal voice?
One needs to scan all the modes of citizen activity and all the
channels for the expression of dtizen voice through that activity to
estimate the extent of political equality. If one attempts such measure-
ment—looking first at the degree of political equality in each mode—
one finds unambiguously that political voice is far from equal. There is
wide variation in the degree of equality from voting (the most equal of
activities, though far from equal), through various kinds of campaign
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least equal). Even protest activity—the weapon of the weak who are
otherwise not well endowed with political resources—is more  often
used by more advantaged citizens.^'
If we summarize across domains, we find, in general, more rather
than less inequality. Full equality in political voice would mean  that
each dtizen or each significant political grouping would—taking activ-
ity all together—have an equal share of what was communicated i n
the various ways. In general, though, things usually come together to
create overall unequal results. Those individuals and groups that are
advantaged i n socioeconomic terms are more likely to be active and
effective across all or most of the channels and modes of activity, from
the electoral system to the courts and the interest group system. They
have more of what it takes to be active—more resources, more motiva-
tion, better connections. The result is an accumulation of inequality,
not a balance of one inequality by another.
SOME POSSIBLE CONFLICTS WITH  EQUALITY
Equaiity and Effectiveness
Government depends on expertise, on the refinement o f citizen pref-
erences through the legislative process. Equal voice as direct populist
control can lead to ineflRdent government, shortsighted  government,
ineffective  government. Equal voice does not necessarily entail such
direct control. It could be equal voice over who is elected to office or
over the implementation of laws. But insofar as those who are usually
left out of decisions when voice is not equal—those less well endowed
with resources, especially skills and information—are  likely to have
less understanding of policy issues, equality of voice may lead to lower
quality of government  performance. I n tum, an ineffective  govern-
ment—^where economic growth is stified or national security ignored
or other failures of policy take place—is not likely to be considered
fair  and  equal. Few nations can completely  avoid this downside o f
democratic equality of voice. (Note: the issue here is not one of political
voice in general but equality of voice. Thistee or expert rule diminishes
530  social researchthe overall eflfect of dtizen voice, but may allow equal voice and effec-
tive government. The issue here is that imequal voice—with dispro-
portionate voice coming from more advantaged citizens who have a
better understanding of the issues—may lead to more effective  poli-
des. perhaps for all dtizens if. for instance, the trustee/expert increases
economic growth and improves performance. Equality of process may
be in conflict with effectiveness of output.
There is. however, another side to the story. Less well educated
citizens may not have as full a grasp of policy issues as those better
endowed, but they do know better than others their preferences and,
probably, their needs. If they are silent, policy may be more  effident
and effective, but it is also likely to be tilted to advantage some and
disadvantage others.
Equality and Liberty
In general, those who are less active tend to be people who are less
committed to essential political liberties. Couple that with the possibil-
ity that equal voice will lead to majoritarian  outcomes (they need not
so do. but might), there is a chance that equal voice might be voice in
favor of limiting the essential liberties needed for democratic function-
ing. Again, this is not an inevitable result. Indeed, one can consider
equal voice as requiring equal political rights to free speech, as well as
equal capability to exercise that right. If this is so. as Sen has argued,
the usual counterpoise of liberty and equality is misguided. Equal voice
entails a free voice.
In Sum
Political  equality can mean  many things,  from  the equal  right to
participate to equal treatment of all by the govenunent. Equal politi-
cal rights are fairly well established in the United States, though they
are sometimes not enforced equally. But equal treatment for all is not
possible, since individuals and groups have different needs and prefer-
ences, and polides favoring some are less favorable to others. Thus, this
approach to fairness as equal voice has concentrated on political equal-
Fairness. Equality, and Democracy  531ity as equality across individuals and groups in the capacity to express
political needs and preferences and in the actual use of that capacity.
Democracies are sounder when the reason why some lose does not rest
on the fact that they are invisible to those who make decisions. Equal
treatment may be imattainable, but equal consideration is a goal worth
striving for. And for the latter to exist, equal capacity to express politi-
cal voice and equal expression of that voice are key.
CONCLUSION
A fair polity, I have argued, is one in which citizen voice is equal.
I have tried to define  equal voice and to argue for its centrality  for
a fair democracy. I have also discussed the conditions under  which
citizen voices will be equal. That discussion makes it clear that such
equal voice is not easy to come by, and may be rare indeed. And even
if all citizens speak with  equally loud  and compelling voices,  the
response may benefit  some more than others. And there are  other
downsides.
So why do we want it? Equal political voice may not be attainable
and sometimes may have negative effect, but it is better to have it (even
if incomplete) than not to have it.
NOTES
1. Thus. Barry says about justice as impartiality: "Principles of justice
that satisfy its conditions are impartial because they captiure a certain
kind of equality: all of those aflFected have to be able to feel that they
have done as well as they could reasonably hope to" (Barry, 1995: 7).
2. I retum below to the relationship of equal processes for expressing
political voice and equal outcomes from government action.
3. The characterization o f these various  stages i s not  based o n an
abstract formulation o f what makes for equal political input. In a
series of  books and articles, my collaborators and I have traced out the
workings of such a multi-stage civic voluntarism model to show how
diflFerences in political activity across groups—defined by class, race,
ethnicity, gender, or age—derive from the interaction of resources.
532  social researchmotivation, and opportunity structures that lead to political activ-
ity. For the general presentation of the model, see Verba, Schlozman,
and Brady (1995), For a closer look at the way in which institutions—
schools, family, job, voluntary associations, and religious institutions
jointly have a cumulative eflfect on motivation, resources, and oppor-
tunities, see Bums, Schlozman, and Verba (2001).
4, This point needs qualification, however. Formal rights may exist but
be violated in practice. Consider, for instance, the 2000 election in
Florida, where there appears to have been differential opportimity to
vote, depending on where one lived—^with serious consequences for
radal equality in opportunity to vote,
5, Quoted in Thompson (2002: 19); from Shklar (1991), There continue
to be, however, disagreements over the universality of the right to
partidpate. For instance, in many states, convicted felons do not have
the right to vote; in some cases, that ban remains in eflFect for life.
Relatively few, if any, restrictions apply to the speech rights of people
in the United States, but there are restrictions on monetary contribu-
tions from noncitizens. And the issue of voting rights for long-term
non-dtizen residents is controversial,
6, See Lijphart (1997) for an argument in favor of mandatory voting to
achieve equality,
7, This is a good example of the way in which intent colors the sense
of unfairness. If a "naturally occumring" district is tilted to one party,
that will not be perceived to be as unfair—perhaps  not unfair a t
all—compared with deliberate skewing through partisan dominated
redistricting,
8, On recent trends in interest groups that documents the tilt of the
pressure system toward business and the more advantaged and away
from the poor, see Schlozman, Burch, and Lampert (2004), See also
Berry (1999), Berry shows how the "new" public interest groups that
often challenge business speak for middle-dass issues such as the
environment and rarely speak for the poor,
9, This approach i s quite compatible with Amartya Sen*s capability
approach. See Sen (2000), For an interesting discussion of the rela-
Fairness, Equality, and Dennocracy  533tJonship between Sen's capability approach and EKvorkin's resources
approach, see Browne and Stears (2003).
10. The point is not as vacuous as it sounds. In our research we considered
two resources that one can use in politics: time and money. The rich,
we know, have more money. So do other politically relevant groups—
that is, whites rather than blacks, men rather than women, people
in high-status jobs rather than those in low-status jobs. This means
that there are real needs and preference diflFerences between those
with more or less money. Time, we discovered, is not more available
to rich or poor, or by race, gender, or occupation. Rather it depends
on specific life circumstances—^working full time or not. children or
not—sometimes politically relevant diflFerences but less often so. See
Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (2005).
11. Actually, our data show that giving time to politics does not seem to
be dependent on having free time; that is, the amount of time spent
on political campaigns or community issues does not seem to be
afFected by job and family obligations. The old adage, "If you want
something done, ask a busy person" seems to be true. Note that it is
not the case that "If you want a lai^e campaign contribution, ask a
poor person." See Verba. Schlozman, and Brady (2005).
12. Or, as discussed above, two individuals may each cast the one equal
vote to which each is entitled, but the vote of one may be counted
and the other not counted. Or the vote of one (in a Senate race in
VS^oming) may count for more than the vote of the other (in a Senate
race in California).
13. Recent work beginning to close this gap includes Hill and Leighley
(1992), Angela Hinton-Andersson (1995), and Bartels (2005). See also
Campbell (2003) for a discussion of the impact of the elderly's views
on government response. For an earlier attempt to link activity to
response, see Verba and Nie (1972, chaps. 17-19).
14. There are others wa)rs. John Rawls in A Theory of  Justice starts in an
imagined world of rational people in a contrived state of ignorance as
to who they are and where they fit into sodety, and thus do not have
conflicting preferences. But later in Political liberalism he addresses
534  social researchthe inevitability of conjQicting values and preferences and finds the
solution to peaceful dedsion making in agreement on a freestanding
overlapping consensus on a democratic process that involves tolerat-
ing alternative doctrines. This, as he notes and as many democratic
theorists have noted before, is needed to maintain a stable democ-
racy given the inevitable plurality of competing doctrines subscribed
to by dtizens in a democracy. Some deliberative democracy theorists
might try to avoid diflFerences in preferences for outcomes by open
discussion through which people would come to an  enlightened
consensus. One need not be cynical to believe this will not remove all
disagreements about polides or personnel.
15. Process and outcome are closely related. Process affects outcomes and
outcomes, in tum, affect process. We return to this below as well as to
further discussion of the foats on process rather than outcome. For
an argimient that outcome rather than process is the better approach
to political equality, see Dworkin (2000: 185  flF)  and the discussion
below.
16. Nor can one expect political philosophers to mediate the  conflicts
within the public to come to a determination o f what the public
considers i s fair and equal. As Brian Barry comments, "claims to
derive condusions  firom  the alleged shared values of one's sodety are
always tendendotis. If they were not, it would have to be regarded as
a remarkable coinddence that the shared values that a philosopher
says he has detected always happen to lead to condusions he already
supports' (Barry, 1995:5).
17. Except where the conceptions have to do with the nature of the
political process. This, of course, is why certain democratic process
characteristics—freedom o f speech, right to vote, etc.—represent
constitutional givens whose existence is prior to the political struggle
over polides.
18. Dworkin says that equality of influence is more difficult to measure
than equality of impact The latter refers to the effect my act, acting
alone—e.g., my vote—^would have on a government decision or on
the result of an election. The former refers to the effect m y activity
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as others working in a campaign or for a cause, giving contributions.
Influence seems much more important than impact. Each dtizen
who votes may have the same amount of voice (impact), but dtizens
who make campaign contributions may affect  many votes  (influ-
ence). For works that attempt to measure equality of citizen influ-
ence that encompasses impact and influence (in our terms, political
voice) see Verba. Schlozman. and Brady (2005); Verba and Nie (1972.
chaps. 17-19). For comparison across nations in the equality of politi-
cal voice, see Verba, Nie. and Kim (1979). For a reformulation of the
median voter model that moves  ftx)m  voting "impact" (counting each
dtizen as a voter with one vote) to an "influence" model (counting
each dtizen in terms of his or her own single vote and an estimate of
how many other votes they influence through campaign activity and
contributions), see Verba. Schlozman. and Brady (2005).
19. Another reason Dworkin considers process equality to be an undesir-
able goal is that we cannot and do not want to achieve what he calls
vertical equality. Governing officials  will always have—ought and
need to have—greater political influence than do ordinary dtizens.
This is true, but equality of  political voice need not require incorporat-
ing offidals into its scope. In our formulation, it refers to horizontal
equality among dtizens. If we are concerned with feelings of unfeir-
ness. the feet that offidals  have more influence over government
actions would not seem to be a problem unless their influence derives
from perceived unfair horizontal process-based inequalities among
ordinary dtizens—that is. if the offidals got into power through an
unfeir process.
20. See lipjhart (1997). Dworkin makes a distinction between "choice-
sensitive" and  "choice-insensitive"  issues (also called  policy  and
prindple issues). The latter ought to be kept out of a  majoritarian
decisional process because the correct decision does not  depend
on the views of the majority. His example is capital punishment or
radal discrimination. But there would certainly be disagreement on
what issues should be "above" democratic processes. And there will
536  social researchcertainly be cases in which there is agreement that an issue is one of
principle, but disagreement on which side has it right. Pro-life and
pnxhoice supporters probably both think that abortion is a choice-
itisensidve issue. From the point of view of democratic processes,
the most important issues that ought to be choice-insensitive are
the basic political rights to participate equally. These ought not to be
amenable to change by majority action.
21. Situations in which there are permanent and disadvantaged minori-
ties—ustially on religiotis or ethnic or radal grounds—are particu-
larly difficult  from  the point o f view of democratic fairness  and
democratic stability. An equal process may require violations of a
mechanically eqtial process through reserved parliamentary seats or
district juggling. These may, of cotirse, be seen as unfair by the major-
ity and their absence as unfair to the minority that otherwise has
little or no political voice.
22. Majorities can be limited in their ability to ignore minority claims by
cotistitutional guarantees of rights that cannot be voted away by the
majority, or by special provisions for  representation o f minorities.
But these may be thought unequal and tmfair by the majority. And, as
Brian Bany puts it: "There is, unfbrtimately, no procedural alchemy
by which a majority bent on injustice can be made to pursue justice
instead. This is a depressing conclusion..." (Bany, 1995:101).
23. For example,  consider  the  following:  "Telecommutiications  and
high-tech companies are pushing Congress to expand  and  make
permanent the Internet tax moratoriimi... [that]... states oppose.
..." And the following: "With the rise of aggressive state attorneys
general willing to investigate industries  fixjm  tobacco to securities to
insurance and banking, many large corporations have begun turn-
ing to Washington for  relief.  Though they once favored dealing with
state regulators, many multinational corporations now would prefer
the oversight of a single federal agency" ("Rebellion of the States,"
2005).
24. Individuals with income under $15,000 belong to an average of 0.5
political organizations and 0.8 nonpolidcal ones. The parallel figures
Fairness, Equality, and Democracy  537for those with annual incomes over $125,000 are 2.6 and 2.9. Source:
Citizen Participation Study Data. For further  itiformation o n  this
study, see Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995, appendices A  and B,
p. 535).
25.Affiliation  with religious institutions i s not stratified b y socioeco-
nomic advantage, a rare case in which  such stratification i s not
present in relation to nongovernment affiliations. Less advantaged
citizens are as likely to be affiliated  with churches as more advan-
taged. But note: as likely, not more likely, which would represent an
equalizing balance to the stratification in other domains.
26. Such an election  need  not be based on  single-member  districts.
Various forms can be considered majoritarian fixjm this perspective,
including proportional representation elections imder which parties
have to form majority coalitions in parliament.
27. The source of political inequality for  these various systems will
vary, but for each inequality will rear its ugly head. In  representa-
tive systems dependent on elections, differences i n turnout  rates
among groups, constituency size, and composition, the oddities of
the Electoral College, un^r voting procedures, and campaign contri-
butions all play a role. In direct democracy, a similar role is played
by skewed turnout as well as the role of money. In discourse democ-
racy, diflFerences of ability to enter the public square and take part
in the deliberation in an eflFective manner make actual deliberations
less than equaL And one does not know how to begin to describe the
tilt of the interest group system toward select parts of society. More
discussion and references are below.
28. See Verba, Schlozman. and Brady (2005) for data on the relative equal-
ity of various political acts.
29. On these "downside" issues, see Verba (2004).
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